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I am going to talk about self-determination (SD) and how the idea and norm of SD 
can impact on the construction of the identity of a people, making it resilient in pursuing 
some sort of liberation. This argument is based on a constructivist perspective that places 
norms at the core of the constitutive interplay between actors and international system. I 
will illustrate the argument considering the construction of a Sahrawi identity that claims 
for SD, considering its resilience in pursuing a project of political independence. 
* 
In international politics, self-determination is both an idea and a norm. As an idea, 
self-determination refers to an inalienable right to freedom, which by its side implies a 
right to fight against oppression imposed by others. At the same time, SD designates 
specific and explicit norms of international law that mainly concern ways of bounding, 
bordering and governing political communities. 
The norm of self-determination has effects at the same time regulative and 
constitutive. I am particularly interested in its constitutive effects, because of the 
productive kind of power they can produce, which I connect with concepts of identity and 
resilience. 
Legitimacy is crucial in these effects. But legitimacy here is a tricky matter. 
By one hand, many identity groups that do not consider themselves to be adequately 
represented by any existing State strive to form their own State or to substantially 
transform the nature of some already existing State. These struggles are tightly connected 
with perceptions of justice which anchor in this modern idea of self-determination as a 
right to liberate from oppression.  
But, on the other hand, the international system functions in ways that favour the 
reproduction of existing entities – this meaning the existing states as well as the State has 
the supreme form of political community. The very norm of self-determination is in 
practice strongly limited by the principle of territorial integrity, not least because of the 
countless and really complex cases of overlapping and conflicting claims to self-
determination. Besides, SD is being increasingly discredited in international top down 
politics. 
So this is not a purely ideological and normative discussion, nor is it always resolved 
with referendums. On the contrary, self-determination is related with much of today’s 
violent political conflict, and especially in territorial conflicts and conflicts that concern 
political representation of national or ethnic identities. These kind of conflicts tend to be 
particularly protracted and deadlier (Jenne, 2006: 7). 
People and groups draw on international norms (both in the sense of norms of 
international law as in the sense of generally accepted ideas and practices) to confront 
oppression and domination. This is instrumental, concerning the regulative effects of 
norms, but has also more deep constitutive effects. International norms can reflect in 
cultural, institutional and material constitution of the groups who claim them. This is 
particularly the case with self-determination, as it concerns the very possibility of being 
recognised and accepted as an international actor. 
As constructivist authors have pointed, international law establishes the conditions 
under which recognition of some entity or identity can be claimed, thus establishing the 
conditions to exist and act institutionally (cf. Ringmar, 1995). But, as notes Kratochwil, 
the existence of a right must in fact be claimed by its holder; at the same time, such right 
safeguards him or her against other sort of moral or instrumental considerations 
(Kratochwil, 1989: 159 ss).  
Thus law can sustain power of a productive kind (Werner, 2010). Law endows 
collective identities and agency not only with interests and rationale but also with the 
capacity to wage sacrifices in struggling for which they perceived as a right. This is only 
possible in face of intersubjective commitments which can generate exclusion, inclusion 
or both. In what concerns the norm of SD, it either can feed a logic of us versus them, as 
it can instead, by way of a reflexive process, build bridges intergenerational, inter social 
class and supra tribal. In this second case it can produce solidarity in the descriptive 
Durkheimian sense, besides the normative or ethical one, referring to the social 
production of cohesion – what is it that holds society, with its multiple components, 
together. 
* 
I will now make a brief outline of the conflict over the territory of the Western Sahara. 
The Western Sahara (WS) conflict – in northern Africa – is basically a conflict 
between the claim of a right to self-determination by the Sahrawi people, which is 
internationally voiced by its liberation movement, the Polisario, and, on the other hand, 
the attempt by Morocco to incorporate it in its kingdom. 
The right to self-determination was first recognised to the population of the territory 
by the UN in 1964, referring to the GA Resolution 1514 – the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples – meaning that the population of the 
territory could choose between independence, free association or integration with an 
independent State. To this purpose, Spain, the colonial power, should organise a 
referendum, which she started planning in the beginning of the 1970s. Morocco and 
Mauritania had started to claim the self-determination of the territory in the previous 
decade, but with the perspective that populations in the north and in the south would 
choose to integrate in its States, respectively. Meanwhile, a nationalist movement held by 
young and educated Sahrawis developed in the territory. In 1974 Morocco pressed the 
GA to request the International Court of Justice an Advisory Opinion on the status of the 
territory before colonisation. The court’s ultimate conclusion was again that the 
population should exercise its right to self-determination in accordance with the GA 
Resolution 1514.  
When Spain hastily withdraw from the territory in 1975, Morocco and Mauritania 
invaded it from the north and the south, respectively. Then a war was waged against them 
by Polisario. At the same time, thousands of Sahrawis flew to the Algerian region of 
Tindouf. Peace with Mauritania was held in 1979. With Morocco, the war halted in 1988 
and in 1991 it was implemented on the ground a peacekeeping mission: the UN Mission 
for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO – from its designation in Spanish). 
The identification of the voters for the referendum was a very complicated process during 
the 1990s – while Polisario tried to stick to the census that Spain had already made, 
Morocco tried to include thousands of other names, based on tribal or residential criteria, 
since it had been dislocating Moroccan citizens to the WS. The UN did not thwart 
effectively these Moroccan tactics. Since 2001 the resolution of the conflict is being 
approached by the UN in terms of the negotiation of a political solution that can be 
accepted by both parts. Meanwhile, most of the territory is de facto occupied by Morocco 
– with military forces, thousands of settlers and companies exploring the natural resources 
of the territory – and about 200 000 people rest in refugee camps run by Polisario in 
Algeria. 
Though the parts still comply with the cease-fire, conflict persists: 
• In Tindouf, some groups of former fighters and young men try to push Polisario 
to resume armed conflict. 
• A high level of militarization, intimidation, social control, coercion and 
propaganda still persist, with some variations in both sides. 
• In the occupied territories there has been growing activities of resistance, 
contestation and claim; these activities are being held in nonviolent ways – with 
demonstrations, encampments, sit-ins and hunger strikes – yet being violently 
repressed. 
• Violations of Sahrawis’ human rights have been decreasing, but still happen, 
mainly in the occupied territories, where there is already a huge record of 
disappeared people, illegal detentions, imprisonment for political reasons (though 
justified as common crime), torture, beatings and sexual violence. 
• In the negotiations being held since 2007 some progresses have been made in what 
concerns things such as demining or meetings among separated families. But the 
parts remain irreducible in what concerns the ultimate scenarios to the resolution 
of the conflict. 
Morocco proposes an autonomy plan for the territory to be approved by the population 
through a referendum, and does not accept that political independence of the territory 
would be an option in such, or any other, referendum. By its side, it is precisely this option 
for political independence that Polisario takes as nonnegotiable and persists claiming the 
organization of a referendum for the Sahrawis to decide on that. 
Polisario sustains its claims in the fact that the international community recognizes a 
right to self-determination to the Sahrawi people, particularly de UN and the African 
Union. By its side, Morocco argues that before colonisation the territory was inhabited 
by populations that plied allegiance and were loyal to Moroccan sultan. Based on that, he 
tries to legitimate the effective occupation of most of the territory, invoking the principles 
of territorial integrity and non-interference. 
The question of whether a Sahrawi people exists, as well as the related question of 
who precisely belongs to this people, have been questions crucial in debating the origins 
of the conflict and the scenarios to resolve it. Morocco argues that that there is a huge 
ambivalence in defining and bordering a Sahrawi people, and, because of that, it is not 
possible to hold a credible self-determination vote. Besides, it insists on conveying the 
idea that the Sahrawi people is, literally, the whole population that inhabits the whole vast 
Sahara desert, a bunch of anarchic and quarrelsome tribes that would not be able to build 
a viable independent State. Polisario assumes such a people exists and one should depart 
from the colonial experience in order to identify its boundaries. 
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
(Resolução da AG 1514 [XV] de 1960) had recognised, in 1960, the right to self-
determination to peoples under colonial dominion. But the Declaration had also 
subordinated such right to the principle of the territorial integrity, stating that – quoting – 
“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations” (paragraph 6). However, this paragraph could have had two different 
interpretations. It could refer to a pre-colonial era, in which case it would mean the 
territorial area of an ethnic group or previous political community; or otherwise it could 
refer to the colonial borders. It was this last one interpretation that was adopted. This was 
then further reinforced by the – at the time – Organisation of the African Unity, who 
declared that borders inherited from colonialism were tangible and outlawed its violation 
(AHG/Resolução 16[I] de 1964). This resolution was only opposed by Somalia and 
Morocco, two countries that precisely had the intention to restore an alleged pre-colonial 
unity, upon ethnic and historical arguments. 
The boundaries, the collective consciousness and the institutional lines of the Sahrawi 
– let’s say – self that conveys a project of political independence (this qualification is 
important because not all Sahrawis are for independence) are that much an effect of a 
secular experience of living in the harsh west part of the Sahara desert as they are an effect 
of the international norms and practices that shape modern political communities, among 
them the right to self-determination and its international recognition to the populations of 
the WS. 
I have developed this analysis elsewhere, and have not the time to present it here. 
Suffice to point here that much suffering and sacrifice could be avoided if most of the 
Sahrawi population accepted Moroccan presence, which they do not. 
* 
The deadlock in what concerns the resolution of this conflict has been addressed 
mainly on the basis of the tension between two contrasting logics: power politics in the 
international system, favoring Morocco pretention to integrate the territory in its 
kingdom, and international law, recognizing the right to self-determination to the people 
of the territory.  
Some analysts argue that it is only the international recognition of the right to self-
determination to the population of the territory and the support they get from Algeria that 
prevents the recognition and formalization of an annexation they understand as 
irreversible. For others, the Sahrawis’ right to SD is an inalienable right and the so called 
“international community” cannot give up trying to wage a SD referendum in the 
territory.  
Both perspectives rest is a mainly regulative conception of law and norms. The first 
one tends to see Sahrawi claim for SD as a result of its nationalism, and to see this 
nationalism as an artificial product of the ideology of the decolonisation era. On the 
contrary, to consider a constitutive perspective drives us to look into the institutional 
conditions that make possible and internationally recognisable a political community, 
comprising a population and a territory. It is these conditions that make nationalism to be, 
in this case, a mechanism of liberation, this requiring the reconstruction of a people 
according to such conditions.  
This perspective should not lead to a downgrading of these kind of relatively recent 
nationalists identities, such as the Sahrawi. Instead, the idea is to better understand its 
resilience within a widely international political context that downgrades the 
circumstances, political and normative, that gave rise to this conflict 4 decades ago. 
Giving the way the norm of SD is being devaluated in international politics (I had not the 
time to demonstrate here this point), as well as the somehow late appearance of the 
Sahrawi nationalism, comparing with similar anti-colonial movements, the resilience of 
this SD claim and political independence project would be highly improbable. 
Notwithstanding, it is the main power impending any attempt of legitimisation of the 
Moroccan occupation of the territory, though not enough to get effective SD. 
Besides, to claim SD is what allows Sahrawis to present an identity that is coherent 
with the norms of the international society of States, and so to keep its struggle in ways 
internationally recognisable and legitimate.  
To conclude with reference to the topic of the workshop, my analysis points to 
think that, at the collective level, resilience in political processes is possible when there 
are intersubjective commitments strong enough to sustain perseverance in face of 
domination, oppression or other sort of antagonism. These commitments can be 
particularly effective when justice in the light of common norms is at stake. 
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